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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 Across the Internet, mistaken and malicious routing announcements impose 
significant costs on users and network operators. To make routing announcements 
more reliable and secure, Internet coordination bodies have encouraged network 
operators to adopt the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (“RPKI”) framework. 
Despite this encouragement, RPKI’s adoption rates are low, especially in North 
America.  
 RPKI is a two-sided framework, and on both sides of the framework North 
American networks lag behind their peers around the globe. For RPKI to provide 
increased security, networks must first issue route origin authorizations (“ROAs”) to 
cover their Internet Protocol (“IP”) address space. Other networks must also conduct 
route origin validation (“ROV”) on the basis of these ROAs to ensure that routing 
announcements originate from authorized parties.  
 Recent analysis has suggested that North American networks have issued 
proportionately fewer ROAs than networks around the globe. Further, when 
conducting ROV, networks worldwide are less likely to validate routes against North 
American ROAs than against ROAs issued by networks in other regions of the world. 
In other words, a material portion of networks conducting ROV do not validate routes 
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originating from North American networks. Taken together, these two analyses paint 
a problematic picture. North American networks are less likely than their global 
peers to publish ROAs, and when they do, their ROAs are less likely to be utilized in 
determining routing tables. 
 This report presents the results of a year-long investigation into the 
hypothesis—widespread within the network operator community—that legal issues 
pose barriers to RPKI adoption and are one cause of the disparities between North 
America and other regions of the world. On the basis of interviews and analysis of 
the legal framework governing RPKI, the report evaluates the issues raised by 
community members and proposes a number of strategies to reduce or circumvent 
the barriers that are material. The report also describes substantial action taken this 
year by the American Registry for Internet Numbers (“ARIN”) and other private 
organizations in light of public dialogue about RPKI. 
 RPKI presents a classic “chicken-and-egg” problem: While adoption may be net 
beneficial to the Internet community as a whole, its attractiveness to any individual 
network operator depends on expectations about other operators’ willingness to 
adopt. The legal issues analyzed in this report are sources of friction. They deter 
individual actors from adopting RPKI on the merits, which in turn leads to reduced 
expectations about the prospects for mass adoption in the future. Reduction of these 
sources of friction would spur RPKI adoption through two mechanisms. First, reduced 
legal barriers would make RPKI more attractive to network operators considering 
whether to implement RPKI. Second, a marginal shift may alter other network 
participants’ expectations about the future of RPKI. When everyone expects more 
adoption, more adoption will take place. Any reduction in the legal barriers to 
adoption thus may contribute to a positive feedback loop that can promote wider 
deployment of RPKI. 
 Our recommendations mainly focus on the two sides of the RPKI framework: 
issuing ROAs for inclusion in RPKI repositories and conducting ROV on the basis of 
RPKI repository information. Though ROAs are logically prior to ROV in the 
production sequence, the legal issues surrounding ROV are more significant than 
those surrounding the issuance of ROAs. Therefore, we address them first. On the 
ROV side of the equation, the principal legal obstacles stem from the terms and 
conditions governing access to the RPKI repository offered by ARIN in its Relying 
Party Agreement (“RPA”) and the manner it employs to ensure the agreement is 
binding.  
 Over the course of the past year, ARIN—a private, nonprofit organization that 
serves as the Regional Internet Registry (“RIR”) for the United States, Canada, and 
part of the Caribbean—has made a salutary change to its RPA in response to 
community dialogue. Specifically, ARIN enabled third-party software developers to 
incorporate acceptance of the RPA into their software workflow. If developers 
capitalize on this change, network operators will be able to rely on third-party 
software to access the ARIN RPKI repository more easily. This change built on 
ARIN’s decision in 2016 to move from a cumbersome email-based method of RPA 
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acceptance to a browser interface-based method. ARIN has also been an active 
participant in dialogue about further potential changes to support RPKI adoption.  
 This report is meant to spur further dialogue by clarifying key topics of debate. 
It recommends the following: 
1. The goal of widespread ROV counsels in favor of ARIN reviewing its current 
approach to repository distribution, embodied in the RPA. We conclude that 
two paths would be reasonable. First, ARIN should consider dropping the 
RPA altogether. This would remove the most significant legal barriers to 
widespread utilization of the ARIN RPKI repository. Second, because the 
legal risks faced by ARIN in an RPA-free world are ultimately uncertain, it 
would also be reasonable for ARIN to maintain the RPA for the purposes of 
contractually allocating risks to the parties best positioned to reduce and 
mitigate them. If ARIN keeps the RPA, ARIN should consider removing the 
RPA’s indemnification clause, instead of relying solely on the RPA’s 
disclaimers of warranties and limitations of liability, or at least reducing 
the indemnification clause’s scope to eliminate the problem of moral hazard. 
2. Developers of RPKI validation software should consider integrating 
acceptance of ARIN’s RPA into their software workflows. ARIN recently 
enabled this possibility, and developers should deliberate on whether to 
capitalize on the opportunity.  
3. The network operator community and ARIN should more broadly publicize 
ARIN’s policy of revising various RPA clauses for government entities that 
are prohibited from agreeing to them. 
4. In addition to the important step ARIN has already taken to enable third-
party software developers to integrate RPA acceptance into their software 
workflows, ARIN should consider reducing the barriers to third-party 
service development imposed by the RPA’s prohibited conduct clause. 
Specifically, ARIN should consider methods for allowing approved 
developers to make use of RPKI information as an input into more 
sophisticated services. 
5. Separately, ARIN should consider revising the prohibited conduct clause to 
allow broader distribution of information created with RPKI as an input for 
research and analysis purposes. 
6. As a general alternative, the Internet community should consider whether 
to develop a separate corporate entity that would be responsible for 
operational aspects of RPKI repository provision. That corporation could 
conduct such activities for the North American region, or on a worldwide 
basis. 
 Regarding the ROA-issuance side of the equation, the principal legal obstacles 
stem from the terms and conditions found in ARIN’s Registration Services Agreement 
(“RSA”), Legacy Registration Services Agreement (“LRSA”), and RPKI Terms of 
Service. Regarding these, the report recommends the following: 
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1. ARIN should consider adopting a pathway to provide RPKI services that 
would explicitly refrain from altering the existing balance of property and 
transferability rights associated with legacy IP address allocations. 
2. The network operator community and ARIN should broadly publicize 
ARIN’s policy of revising certain RSA/LRSA and RPKI Terms of Service 
clauses for government entities that are prohibited from agreeing to them, 
including indemnification, arbitration, and choice of law clauses. ARIN 
should also begin presenting the RPKI Terms of Service to newly-onboarded 
members alongside their RSA/LRSA, so that organizations spend less time 
dealing with legal issues overall. 
 Separately, the report recommends that the network operator community 
consider whether to encourage companies and the federal government to include 
RPKI adoption in procurement best practices or requirements.  
 In tandem with recommendations designed to encourage adoption, the report 
also makes two recommendations concerning operational readiness for widespread 
RPKI deployment. Specifically: 
1. To reduce any legal risks associated with RPKI, the network operator 
community should focus on adopting operational best practices. No system 
is 100% reliable across all contingencies; as a result, operators should 
prepare for outages and other headaches. RPKI implementations should be 
resilient in the face of such contingencies. 
2. The five RIRs should work to ensure readiness for widespread RPKI 
adoption and strive to publicize deeper details on their service-level 
intentions to the Internet community. 
 All of these recommendations are meant to be consistent with the goals 
espoused in the IETF Requests for Comments (“RFCs”) that set standards for RPKI1 
and with ARIN’s Articles of Incorporation.2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The networks constituting the global Internet employ the Border Gateway 
Protocol (“BGP”) to publish routing announcements. These announcements advertise 
potential pathways across which data can travel from one endpoint to another. 
Individual networks rely on them to build forwarding tables, which determine data 
paths. The contents of those tables are important. If a table contains a route derived 
                                            
1 See, e.g., Matt Lepinski & Stephen Kent, An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing, IETF 
RFC 6480 (rel. Feb. 2012), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6480; Randy Bush, Origin Validation 
Operation Based on the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), IETF RFC 7115 (rel. Jan. 2014), 
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7115 [hereinafter “RFC 7115”]. 
2 See Articles of Incorporation, ARIN (Aug. 7, 1997), 
https://www.arin.net/about_us/corp_docs/artic_incorp.html. 
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from an erroneous or fraudulent announcement, then data might be sent in a 
direction that prevents them from reaching their true destination or sent through a 
network controlled by a malicious actor. 
 Despite these security threats, network operators do not typically authenticate 
route announcements. BGP does not contain security features to ensure routing 
accuracy. Rather, BGP operates on a “transitive trust” model, where networks often 
assume that the routes advertised by their neighboring networks are, in fact, viable. 
This leaves BGP “surprisingly vulnerable to attack.”3 In April 2018, malicious actors 
successfully executed a routing hijack to redirect traffic meant for Amazon Route 53, 
Amazon’s authoritative Domain Name System (“DNS”) service. This attack 
facilitated the theft of approximately $150,000 in cryptocurrency.4 Months later, 
hijackers attacked major credit card processors based in the United States.5 The 
public record of similar attacks and routing mistakes is growing,6 and it is possible 
that other incidents have taken place but escaped public notice. 
 One partial solution to the problem of BGP security is the Resource Public Key 
Infrastructure (“RPKI”). RPKI complements BGP’s “transitive trust” system with an 
additional layer of security generated by an “anchored trust” system. RPKI’s system 
is based on public-key cryptography. Under RPKI, regional Internet registries 
(“RIRs”)—the organizations responsible for allocating and managing Internet 
Protocol (“IP”) addresses and Autonomous System (“AS”) numbers to the Internet’s 
many participating networks—serve as trust anchors for an authentication system. 
They do so by allocating private cryptographic keys to the holders of IP addresses. 
These keys allow their holders to publish secure digital objects called “Route Origin 
Authorizations” (“ROAs”), which establish which networks are authorized to 
originate routes associated with particular IP addresses. The existence of these ROAs 
enables other parties to validate the authenticity of route announcements: One can 
validate a route announcement by comparing its point of origin with the ROAs 
contained in the RPKI repository maintained by the RIR that issued the address 
prefix. This process is known as Route Origin Validation (“ROV”).7 Networks can then 
adopt various practices to filter routes appropriately based on ROV information.  
                                            
3 Sharon Goldberg, Why Is It Taking So Long to Secure Internet Routing?, ACM QUEUE (Sept. 11, 2014), 
http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2668966. 
4 See Doug Madory, BGP Hijack of Amazon DNS to Steal Cryptocurrency, ORACLE DYN VANTAGEPOINT 
(Apr. 25, 2018), https://dyn.com/blog/bgp-hijack-of-amazon-dns-to-steal-crypto-currency/. This 
incident illustrates that routing attacks can be used to affect critical Internet services like 
authoritative DNS resolution, which, given migration to the cloud, can affect what used to be internal 
systems. 
5 See Doug Madory, BGP/DNS Hijacks Target Payment Systems, ORACLE DYN VANTAGEPOINT (Aug. 3, 
2018), https://dyn.com/blog/bgp-dns-hijacks-target-payment-systems/. 
6 See SANDRA MURPHY, ROUTING SECURITY AND RPKI at 3-4 (Nov. 17, 2015), available at 
https://www.nanog.org/sites/default/files/04-Murphy-StLouis.pdf. 
7 Validators typically cache ROAs instead of looking them up in the RPKI repository every time. 
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 RPKI is only a partial solution to the problem of BGP security because it does 
not account for the entire routing path. But its value should not be discounted merely 
because it is not a panacea. As Internet topology increasingly shifts toward a world 
where there are fewer hops between origin and endpoint,8 a routing announcement’s 
origin represents a comparatively significant portion of its full path. In the limit, 
where there is only one hop between origin and endpoint, origin validation is path 
validation. Thus, the value of RPKI is even higher among parties that utilize short 
paths to reach each other. Among near neighbors in network topology, RPKI’s origin 
validation framework is a particularly important contribution to routing security. 
 RPKI is a two-sided framework. For it to be successful, network operators must 
use private keys to sign and publish certificates authenticating the origins of routes 
for IP addresses under their control. Then they must also filter routes in their routing 
tables based on the certificates provided by other networks, while following best 
practices to ensure such filtering is done safely and wisely. Roughly speaking, the 
value of adopting RPKI increases with the number of other networks that have also 
adopted RPKI—a classic network effect. Moreover, the value on each side of the 
framework increases with the number of participants on the other side, which makes 
the network effect two-sided. The more ROAs there are (assuming accuracy), the 
higher the value of engaging in ROV. In turn, the more participants that engage in 
ROV, the higher the value of issuing ROAs. 
 Despite the fact that leading coordination bodies such as the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (“IETF”) Working Group on Secure Inter-Domain Routing 
(“SIDR”), RIRs, and the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(“NIST”) have long promoted RPKI adoption,9 adoption rates remain low globally. 
North American adoption levels (the subject of this paper) remain below the adoption 
rates seen in Europe and Latin America (as depicted in Figure 1). On the signing side, 
data collected by U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) 
indicate that the percentage of IPv4 address space covered by ROAs in the ARIN 
region has lagged behind the levels achieved in the areas governed by Réseaux IP 
Européens (“RIPE”) (covering Europe and the portions of Asia within the Middle East 
and Russia) and the Latin American and Caribbean Information Centre (“LACNIC”) 
(covering Latin America and some of the Caribbean). Somewhat curiously, ROA 
                                            
8 See Christopher S. Yoo, Paul Baran, Network Theory, and the Past, Present, and Future of the 
Internet, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2019). 
9 See WILLIAM HAAG, DOUG MONTGOMERY, WILLIAM C. BARKER, & ALLEN TAN, NIST SPECIAL 
PUBLICATION 1800-14: PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF INTERNET ROUTING: BORDER GATEWAY 
PROTOCOL (BGP) ROUTE ORIGIN VALIDATION (2018), available at 
https://www.nccoe.nist.gov/sites/default/files/library/sp1800/sidr-piir-nist-sp1800-14-draft.pdf (draft); 
Secure Interdomain Routing (sidr), IETF, https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/sidr/about/ (last visited Dec. 
27, 2018); Resource Certification (RPKI), RIPE NCC, https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-
asns/resource-management/certification (last visited Dec. 27, 2018); KOTIKALAPUDI SRIRAM & 
DOUGLAS MONTGOMERY, DRAFT NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-189: SECURE INTERDOMAIN TRAFFIC 
EXCHANGE: BGP ROBUSTNESS AND DDOS MITIGATION (Dec. 2018) (on file with authors and likely 
available upon resumption of U.S. government funding to NIST at 
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-189/draft). 
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coverage in the ARIN region declined from September 2016 to September 2018. The 
recovery in the last quarter of 2018 only succeeded in bringing ARIN ROA coverage 
back to near the 2016 levels. 
 
Source:  Nat’l Inst. of Standards and Tech., RPKI Deployment Monitor, 
https://www.nist.gov/services-resources/software/nist-rpki-deployment-
monitor-and-test-system (last visited Dec. 21, 2018). 
 On the filtering side, a recent study indicated that the number of networks 
engaging in ROV filtering in the ARIN region falls far below the number of networks 
engaging in ROV filtering in the RIPE region.10 Another study concluded that 20% of 
the networks engaging in ROV filtering are not including the RPKI repository serving 
the ARIN region.11  
 There are some indications that networks are beginning to show greater 
interest in RPKI adoption. Major network participants including Google and 
Cloudflare have indicated that they plan to begin implementing RPKI in the near 
future.12 Discussions on the mailing lists and at the meetings of the North American 
                                            
10 See Measuring RPKI Route Origin Validation Deployment, ROV DEPLOYMENT MONITOR, 
https://rov.rpki.net/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2018). 
11 See Ben Cartwright-Cox, The State of RPKI: Q4 2018, BEN’S BLOG (Dec. 20, 2018), 
https://blog.benjojo.co.uk/post/state-of-rpki-in-2018. 
12 See, e.g., Chris Morrow, Network Security Engineer, Google, So I Need to Start Route Filtering 
Peers, Remarks at the Route Security Track: BGP Route Security, 74th Meeting of the North American 
Network Operators Group (NANOG 74) (Oct. 2, 2018), available at 
https://pc.nanog.org/static/published/meetings/NANOG74/1760/20181003_Tzvetanov_Security_Track
_Bgp_v1.pdf; Jérôme Fleury & Louis Poinsignon, RPKI and BGP: our path to securing Internet 
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Network Operators Group (“NANOG”) and ARIN suggest that others are thinking of 
joining them soon. 
 Over the past few years, a number of network operators in North America and 
around the world have suggested that legal issues might be playing some role in 
holding back adoption. These claims raise concerns with the background law 
governing liability for using systems like RPKI and specific issues with the 
agreements that the RIRs have been using to govern the treatment of RPKI 
resources. But so far, the networking community’s understanding of these legal issues 
has remained somewhat informal. On the basis of stakeholder interviews and 
independent analysis, this report aims to clarify and assess those issues, and then to 
recommend potential solutions.   
 The rest of the report is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background 
on where legal issues fit into the “stack” of considerations facing individuals within 
organizations contemplating adopting RPKI. Section 3 focuses on the route-filtering 
side of the RPKI equation, assessing the perceived legal barriers and proposing 
potential solutions designed to help remove or mitigate the effect of those barriers. 
Section 4 conducts a similar analysis on the ROA-signing side of the equation. Section 
5 broadens the lens beyond potential legal barriers to discuss how affirmative 
strategies, including procurement contracts and increased activity by industry 
organizations, might be used to promote RPKI adoption. Section 6 discusses the 
importance of operational best practices among network operators and RIRs. Section 
7 concludes. 
2. RPKI IN ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
 Decisions about whether to adopt RPKI are made by the networks that 
comprise the global Internet, including large end users, “last mile” Internet service 
providers, transit providers, backbone providers, and Internet exchange points, 
among others. Within those organizations, judgments about RPKI’s costs and benefits 
are most likely to be made by network engineers. As the actors primarily responsible 
for dealing with the problems RPKI is meant to address, they are the natural 
advocates for it. Furthermore, these engineers pay attention to the standards-
development work that has promoted RPKI. They are often members of professional 
communities like the North American Network Operators Group (“NANOG”), which 
offer technical support to would-be adopters.  
 The RPKI adoption decision involves considerations beyond the technology’s 
merits. Network engineers face myriad demands on their scarce time and financial 
resources. As a result, they must weigh the value of adopting RPKI against its costs—
including the opportunity costs of foregone effort on other projects. They must also 
consider whether other departments and functions within their organizations have 
                                            
Routing, CLOUDFLARE BLOG (Sept. 19, 2018), https://blog.cloudflare.com/rpki-details/; Martin J. Levy, 
RPKI – The required cryptographic upgrade go BGP routing, CLOUDFLARE BLOG (Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://blog.cloudflare.com/rpki/. 
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stakes in the decision to adopt RPKI, which varies by organization based on their 
particular risk and legal review practices. This is one place where legal questions 
come into play. Because RPKI raises potential operational risks if not implemented 
properly, network engineers interested in adopting it must consider whether and how 
to engage their colleagues in legal and procurement departments. They must weigh 
the cost of such engagement both in terms of time and institutional capital. Budgets 
are not infinite, and RPKI is a technically complex framework to explain. As a result, 
any issue—even a seemingly small one—can put a weight on the scale against 
adoption, especially early on in the accumulation of network effects, where the value 
of adoption to first movers can be low. This is not unique to RPKI, of course, but it 
can be significant. 
3. ROUTE VALIDATION AND FILTERING 
 
 Just as RPKI can be viewed as two interrelated processes—ROA issuance and 
ROV-based filtering—the legal framework can also be divided into two distinct 
portions. The first we will address is ROV-based route filtering.  
 To improve the security of routing, the design of the RPKI framework 
contemplates that networks will filter routes based on RPKI information. That is, 
networks are encouraged to adopt best practices regarding dropping routes that are 
not authenticated, while also maintaining reliable fallback configurations to account 
for the risk of faults or unavailability of the RPKI service itself.  
 Networks deploying RPKI can follow different adoption paths. Some networks 
may filter based on their own ROV analysis. Or, as is often the case with special-
purpose additions to Internet security efforts, networks may seek to rely on 
information provided by third parties that offer ROV either as a commercial service 
or as a free service. Due to the benefits of specialization and scale economies, the 
latter might enable growth in the value of RPKI information—for instance, if a 
private company or open-source provider offered a set of route filters based on RPKI 
information in tandem with other information, such as information obtained from 
Internet Routing Registries (“IRRs”).  
 In any case, parties conducting ROV need access to the RPKI repositories of 
the RIRs. From a legal perspective, this means that key issues include (a) access to 
the RPKI repositories and (b) redistribution of those repositories and information 
developed based on them. This Section discusses those issues. It is motivated by the 
objective of fostering broad distribution and use of RPKI-based route analysis, 
consistent with reasonable allocation of risks and duties among stakeholders.  
3.1 Background 
 
 Access to RPKI informational repositories is necessary for anyone who wants 
to conduct ROV and is thus essential to RPKI’s success. The RPKI repositories 
represent the “public” portion of the public key infrastructure. Repositories for each 
region of the globe are provided by the RIRs for those regions. The technical designers 
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of the system envisioned they would be widely distributed around the world and that 
any party engaging in ROV worldwide would do so for all routes worldwide. The 
nature of repository distribution means that the providers and users are in a 
relationship with each other with potential legal implications in cases where the use 
of RPKI leads to harm. Providers and users may both want to structure that 
relationship to allocate rights and responsibilities over the production, distribution, 
and use of repository information in a sensible manner. 
 Each RIR has the authority to structure access to its own repository of RPKI 
information as it sees fit. For North America, the source of this information is the 
American Registry for Internet Numbers (“ARIN”) RPKI repository, which includes 
ARIN’s repository of RPKI certificates, certificate revocation lists, signed objects, and 
ARIN’s public key.13 Parties wishing to conduct ROV for route announcements for 
locations originating in North America need access to the authentic ARIN Repository. 
Such access is provided via a file called a Trust Anchor Locator (“TAL”). 
 The key legal document governing access to ARIN’s repository is called the 
Relying Party Agreement (“RPA”). To access ARIN’s repository, parties must 
download the TAL file from an ARIN website. This webpage contains a statement 
that “[t]he ARIN Repository is available to anyone under the terms and conditions in 
the Relying Party Agreement,” immediately followed by a link to the RPA.14 The 
agreement is what lawyers call “browsewrap.”15 This means that the webpage visitor 
does not need to affirmatively click on an acceptance box in order to access resources, 
but the webpage states that use of the resources constitutes an agreement to be bound 
by the terms contained in the document accessible through a link on the webpage. 
That statement and the link are prominently displayed in a visitor’s visual field. 
Though courts are wary of enforcing browsewrap against unwitting parties, they are 
willing to do so where parties have actual or constructive knowledge of the 
agreement’s existence. This is especially true if the party is sophisticated. As a result, 
ARIN’s RPA would likely be held to bind network operators utilizing ARIN’s RPKI 
repository.  
 Interviewees suggest that the RPA is a major source of stakeholder concern 
over the legal framework governing the filtering side of RPKI. These concerns are 
described and evaluated in the Sections that follow. In Section 3.2, we evaluate the 
legal impediments to direct repository access—the kind of access that a party would 
seek if they were planning on doing their own ROV. We also report on changes made 
during the past year that alleviate some of these impediments. In Section 3.3, we 
propose reforms to overcome remaining impediments. In Section 3.4, we address 
                                            
13 See Trust Anchor Locator (TAL), ARIN, available at https://www.arin.net/resources/rpki/tal.html 
(last visited Dec. 27, 2018) [hereinafter “ARIN TAL”]. 
14 See ARIN, Resource Certification Relying Party Agreement, available at 
https://www.arin.net/resources/rpki/rpa.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2018) [hereinafter “ARIN RPA”]. 
15 The words “Relying Party Agreement” serve as a hyperlink to a PDF of the RPA itself, and the link 
is further denoted by an Adobe Acrobat logo appearing next to the words. See ARIN TAL, supra note 
13. 
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issues specific to governmental entities seeking direct repository access. In Section 
3.5, we address legal impediments to indirect repository access—the kind of access a 
party would receive from an intermediary offering ROV as a commercial service or as 
a free service. We describe changes made during the past year to reduce some of these 
barriers and evaluate and propose reforms to the remaining ones. 
3.2 Legal Barriers to Direct Repository Access 
 
 Each RIR should ensure that it distributes its RPKI repository in a manner 
consistent with the goals of widespread RPKI adoption and a proper allocation of the 
rights and responsibilities for safe RPKI usage. A number of interviewees with whom 
we spoke as part of our research suggested that some tension exists between those 
two goals, especially in a relatively litigious region such as North America. In that 
region, the organization tasked with navigating the tension is ARIN. This Section 
introduces ARIN and its Relying Party Agreement.  
 Background on ARIN. ARIN is a private, member-driven non-profit 
organization founded in 1997 that serves as the RIR for the United States, Canada, 
and part of the Caribbean and until 2002 also served as the RIR for Latin America 
and Africa. It has a budget of $22 million annually, funded entirely by member 
registration fees and dues without any governmental support. It began participating 
in RPKI along with its peer RIRs in 2008. Since initiating its RPKI efforts, ARIN has 
not engaged in attempts at direct cost recovery for RPKI provision. Instead, it funds 
its RPKI efforts out of its general, member-funded budget. ARIN estimates that over 
the last ten years, it has spent approximately $6 million dollars on RPKI service 
development. These efforts have included software and web interface development; 
the procurement, configuration, and operation of a hardware security module; system 
maintenance; legal analysis and evaluation; and promotional activities. 
 The role of the RPA. Early in our course of interviews, a number of 
interviewees noted that, unlike the other four RIRs, ARIN required would-be route 
origin validators to download its RPKI repository from the ARIN website. In contrast, 
the other four RIRs allow the TALs for their repositories to be included in software 
downloads without having to affirmatively accept any specific terms of service. For 
instance, RIPE Network Coordination Centre (“RIPE NCC”) offers the most popular 
validator software. When a user downloads the RIPE NCC software, the package 
comes with four of the five RPKI repositories preloaded, but the page states that “[t]o 
access ARIN’s [resources], you will have to agree to ARIN’s Relying Party Agreement. 
Please visit [ARIN’s] web page for more information.”16 Similarly, a validator 
provided by Dragon Research Labs similarly includes the TALs for four of the RIRs 
and omits the ARIN TAL. This difference is driven by heightened concerns about legal 
risk in the litigious North American region and by the requirement of contract 
                                            
16 See RIPE NCC, rpki-validator, GITHUB, at lines 140-55 (Mar. 2, 2017), https://github.com/RIPE-
NCC/rpki-validator/blob/rpki-validator-2.24/rpki-validator-app/README.txt. 
 12 
doctrine in the United States that agreements be prominently placed in order to be 
binding. 
 The requirement of agreeing to the RPA to gain access to ARIN’s repository 
raised technical and institutional concerns for interviewees. We discuss each in turn. 
 Technical concerns. As a technical matter, interviewees reported that the 
placement of the ARIN TAL separately from the others creates friction that makes 
ROV setup more onerous. In particular, it inhibits automated distribution of the 
validator software. It also raises the risk that engineers will forget or refuse to 
download ARIN’s repository resources or simply reject ROV altogether.17 While, given 
time and focus, the process of downloading and incorporating an extra TAL into 
validation software is well within the capacity of the average network engineer, time 
and focus are inevitably in scarce supply. Especially because mistakes in the 
configuration of RPKI validation software can have negative consequences, network 
engineers are loath to implement ROV into production unless they are confident it 
can be managed effectively over the long term.  
 Over the course of the year of this study, network engineers had the 
opportunity to present their concerns over the ARIN RPA’s placement in a number of 
fora. As a result of that dialogue, ARIN took the step of explicitly enabling third 
parties to develop software installation tools that handle the repository-collection 
process for their users. Specifically, ARIN now allows third-party software providers 
to collect acceptances to the RPA as a part of a user interface rather than requiring a 
separate visit to the ARIN website.18 This has the potential to be a useful step in 
reducing the barriers to RPKI adoption because it enables the development of turnkey 
ROV solutions. To capitalize on it, developers of ROV software should consider 
designing their software to prompt users to accept the ARIN RPA and conduct ROV 
for all five global regions. This may require deviating from the practice of enabling 
automated installation. Interviewees were enthusiastic about third-party software to 
help solve the chicken-and-egg problem facing RPKI, so exploiting this path may 
prove important to RPKI’s ultimate success. Further discussion on this point can be 
found in Section 3.5, “Legal Barriers to Indirect Use,” below. 
 One other interface design for ensuring RPA acceptance was proposed by 
interviewees. The proposal was to embed the RPA into the source code of a software 
package (like OpenBSD) or directly into the TAL file, itself. Indeed, a recent change 
to the Internet Engineering Task Force (“IETF”) TAL definition seems to contemplate 
the latter approach.19 This approach to creating a binding contract is common in open 
source software distribution. It is attractive because it facilitates automation in the 
                                            
17 This risk is borne out in data, as discussed supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
18 See John Curran, President and CEO of ARIN, Software installation tools retrieving ARIN TAL 
(was: Re: ARIN RPKI TAL deployment issues), NANOG MAILING LIST (Oct. 13, 2018), 
https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2018-October/097528.html. 
19 See Geoff Huston, Samuel Weiler, George Michaelson, Stephen Kent, & Tim Bruijnzeels, Resource 
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal-05, IETF INTERNET 
DRAFT (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-sidrops-https-tal-05. 
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installation process. Unfortunately, we do not view it as a sufficiently reliable method 
of establishing a binding contract in the RPKI context. To create a binding 
browsewrap agreement, a user must have actual or constructive knowledge of the 
agreement. In the case of open source software, a coder would have such knowledge 
of the contents of the source code due to the practical necessity of inspecting the 
source code in the course of software development. But in the RPKI case, there is no 
reason for a repository user to inspect the TAL file’s contents. Indeed, one of the 
reasons for seeking a way to streamline the RPA-acceptance process is to make it so 
network engineers do not have to fiddle with TAL files as they begin engaging in 
ROV. As a result, including the RPA in source code would not reliably ensure that 
anyone is actually seeing the RPA. Therein lies the problem. The proposed method 
would not reliably create a binding agreement. While parties that actually know 
about an agreement buried in source code (for instance, because they saw a 
presentation an NANOG about it) might be deemed bound by it,20 those ignorant of 
it would not be bound by it under U.S. common law. Therefore, assuming it is valuable 
to have an RPA—an assumption we explore in Section 3.3 below—it would need to be 
presented visually to the parties it is meant to bind. 
 Institutional concerns. In addition to technical concerns, many interviewees 
claimed that the RPA was causing institutional friction sufficient to delay or prevent 
RPKI adoption. Network engineers within some organizations state that they are 
wary of entering into the RPA out of fear of running afoul of their organizations’ 
procurement rules.  
 ARIN’s efforts to date. In response to both the technical and institutional 
concerns raised by members, ARIN has devoted significant resources (in terms of 
employee and board time, along with expenditures on legal counsel) to refine the RPA 
consent process. As early as 2014, NANOG participants raised concerns over some of 
the clauses to the agreement and over the fact that ARIN had structured the 
agreement as “clickwrap”—a term for legal agreements that require affirmative 
assent via a mouse-click. In response to these concerns, ARIN reviewed its approach 
                                            
20 See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 402 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that actual 
knowledge of a browsewrap agreement sufficed to establish assent). To the extent a court were to apply 
Virginia law in analyzing the question of assent, constructive knowledge might also be statutorily 
established through application of Virginia’s Computer Information Transactions Act. See VA. CODE 
§ 59.1-504.6(b) (establishing the effectiveness of disclaimers of warranties placed in information 
records). It is far from clear, however, that choice-of-law doctrine would lead most courts to apply 
Virginia law. Choice-of-law analysis will often be case-specific and driven by a particular court’s 
evaluation and balancing of multiple factors. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§ 188; id. § 199 (calling for application of § 188 to “determine the formalities required to make a valid 
contract”). As a result, ARIN is justified in preparing for the application of the laws of any state with 
significant connections to RPKI’s users. 
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to offering the RPKI repository to third parties21 and decided in February 2016 to 
restructure the agreement into the “browsewrap” described above.22 This change 
obviated the need for end users to make an affirmative mouse-click explicitly 
accepting the terms and conditions contained in the RPA before accessing ARIN’s 
TAL. According to multiple interviewees, this change resulted in increased 
willingness among some network engineers to make use of the Repository, as entering 
into browsewrap agreements falls within their understanding of their authority to 
act unilaterally within their organizations.  
 This change did not, however, address the perceived problem for all potential 
users. Many network engineers are not allowed to enter into the RPA browsewrap 
agreement unilaterally. That is because their corporate procurement policies prohibit 
employees from entering into agreements that contain indemnification clauses and 
other terms not seen in standard licenses without first subjecting those agreements 
to internal review. These internal review processes require network engineers to 
invest time in navigating corporate bureaucracy to try out things like RPKI. Internal 
bureaucracy can be valuable to ensuring that all parts of an organization (for 
instance, engineering and legal) are on the same page about a new endeavor and any 
related risks that arise from new dependencies on external services, but they also 
make new endeavors more time-consuming to undertake. 
 Some interviewees further stated that the indemnification clause in ARIN’s 
RPA exceeds what their organizations would be willing to accept to participate in 
ROV. This claim has been hard to vet. On the one hand, some interviewees have 
stated that their legal departments viewed the indemnification clause as too strict. 
Further, there may be a large cohort of non-North-American network operators that 
lack the capacity to assess a legal agreement written in English. On the other hand, 
the fact that all ARIN members have signed a Registration Services Agreement 
(“RSA,” described in more detail in Section 4.1 below) that contains an 
indemnification clause that is substantially similar to the RPA’s indemnification 
clause, suggests that indemnification is not a deal-breaker for those organizations, 
which include many of the most significant networks on the Internet. Rather, it is a 
weight on the scale in operators’ decision-making processes. Our interviews with legal 
personnel have corroborated the view that indemnification is not typically an 
automatic deal-breaker, but rather acts as a weight on the scale. In the end, however, 
every organization will approach the question of indemnification in its own way.  
 On the basis of all these considerations, we draw three conclusions. First, due 
to institutional factors, the RPA’s indemnification clause poses a nontrivial barrier to 
participation in ROV. Second, engineers interested in participating in ROV can and 
should engage their appropriate internal processes to evaluate ARIN’s RPA in its 
                                            
21 See, e.g., John Curran, President and CEO of ARIN, & Steve Ryan, Counsel to ARIN, RPKI Relying 
Party Agreement (RPA) Change (Jan. 2016), available at 
https://www.arin.net/vault/about_us/bot/20160111/exhibit_c.pdf. 
22 See John Curran, President and CEO of ARIN, Change re ARIN RPKI Relying Party TAL Access, 
NANOG MAILING LIST (Feb. 4, 2016), https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2016-
February/084042.html. 
 15 
current form, and as it may evolve over time. Finally, as we discuss below, ARIN 
should continue to consider ways to improve RPA acceptance, including by 
considering changes to the RPA’s terms to make them more acceptable to reticent 
parties. 
3.3 Reforming Direct Access 
 
 Framing the question of reform. Given the reality that the RPA—and 
specifically its indemnification clause—alters the institutional calculus for network 
engineers considering whether to engage in ROV, should ARIN and its members 
consider removing the RPA, revising the indemnification clause, or trying other 
potential solutions?  
 In deciding how best to structure legal limitations on access to the ARIN 
Repository, it is necessary to frame the proper goal. One sensible goal for the Internet 
community, as discussed above, is widespread distribution of RPKI repository 
information. Another goal, of course, is to ensure the ongoing stability and soundness 
of ARIN—a crucial organization in North America’s Internet governance. The RPA 
protects ARIN from undue liability, so any proposal to change it or eliminate it should 
be approached with caution.  
 Plainly, these two goals are sometimes in tension. Though some RPKI 
advocates would wish for RPKI information to flow completely freely, the wisdom of 
that approach cannot be assumed a priori. RIRs have important interests—in proper 
Repository use and appropriate allocation of liability for misuse, for example—that 
reasonably inform how they offer their TALs to potential users.  
 By the same token, for an RIR interested in supporting RPKI adoption, 
complete insulation from potential legal risks is not a feasible goal. Any organization 
that takes productive action in society cannot completely eliminate the risk of liability 
or of having to defend against lawsuits—even frivolous ones over entirely legitimate 
conduct. Instead, the proper objective for an RIR is to balance the risks of incurring 
legal costs against the benefits of engaging in activities that further the 
organization’s goals. This means that legal protection is an exercise in optimization 
and appropriate allocation of risk, not necessarily maximization of legal protections.  
 The uncertain bounds of potential liability. When it comes to distribution 
of RPKI repositories, striking the proper balance between potential benefits and risks 
must take place amid conditions of uncertainty. RPKI is a new service, and we know 
of no lawsuits dealing with the proper apportionment of the potential sources of 
liability associated with it. Furthermore, the exact harm scenarios will shift both with 
increased deployment and as new uses for RPKI information develop. Each RIR and 
relying party must therefore evaluate its legal risk based on its own best assessment 
of how RPKI usage might go wrong and where their liability might lie and weigh 
those risks against the potential benefits of broader RPKI deployment. RIRs and 
relying parties can gain additional perspective into potential liability from RPKI 
failure by drawing comparisons to other situations where providers of similar types 
of trusted information have been subject to legal claims.  
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 Framing the harm scenarios. At its root, an RPKI repository is a body of 
information. It holds information necessary to conduct ROV, including Resource 
Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, and signed objects (including, most 
importantly, ROAs). Though RIRs currently publish the leading RPKI repositories, 
they are not the sole creators of the information contained within them. To the 
contrary, much of the most important information—specifically, the ROAs pertaining 
to specific locations—can be produced only by the parties that hold private keys 
pertaining to specific IP address space. 
 Providers of information might face claims under a number of different legal 
theories. In the case of RPKI, scenarios giving rise to a legal claim include incidents 
that make it impossible or difficult for traffic to reach an Internet endpoint and 
incidents that allow traffic to pass into unwanted hands. How might a repository 
provider like ARIN be implicated in such incidents? Given RPKI’s limited track 
record, it is impossible to be certain, but we conjecture that an aggrieved party might 
accuse ARIN of failing to issue private keys to IP address holders in a proper manner, 
facilitating the issuance of faulty ROAs (whether through administrative error or 
security failure), or improperly revoking private keys or ROAs. Aggrieved parties 
might include network operators, and they might also include downstream customers 
whose traffic has been disrupted or misdirected. 
 One obvious scenario worth considering is how downstream users of RPKI 
information might react if an RIR’s repository were to temporarily become 
unavailable. This is not fanciful: RIRs’ repositories have gone down in the past,23 and 
no amount of diligence can completely eliminate the possibility of similar temporary 
outages in the future. To date, these have had little impact on Internet traffic. That 
may be because networks that utilize ROV find it easy and sensible to adopt best 
practices that respond gracefully to outages and similar problems. But it also may be 
because RPKI is in such early stages of deployment. If some future downstream users 
are unprepared to handle the occasional outage—a possibility that can never be 
completely precluded—then misconfigurations could, under certain circumstances, 
lead to traffic disruptions once RPKI ROV is widely in use.24 In such a situation, an 
RIR might be accused of contributing to the misfortune, even despite the requirement 
for relying parties to utilize best practices in their use of RPKI information.  
 Though the magnitudes and precise harm scenarios vary, every provider of a 
trusted information service used to direct Internet traffic faces risks of this type of 
accusation. Their examples can help inform RIR policy. For instance, Internet 
participants use cryptographic Transport Layer Security (“TLS”) certificates to 
                                            
23 See, e.g., Mark Kosters, ARIN Chief Technology Officer, ARIN RPKI Repository (Update), ARIN (Oct. 
24, 2018), https://www.arin.net/announcements/2018/20181024_update.html (describing an ARIN 
RPKI service issue); RIPE NCC RPKI Repository Outage, RIPE NCC (Feb. 3, 2013), 
https://www.ripe.net/support/service-announcements/service-announcements/ripe-ncc-rpki-
repository-outage (describing a RIPE NCC RPKI repository outage). 
24 It is worth noting that, at present, even network operators who are already using RPKI today are 
not perfect at doing so. See, e.g., Nusenu, Cleaning Up ROAs Inconsistent with the BGP State, APNIC 
(Oct. 16, 2018), https://blog.apnic.net/2018/10/16/cleaning-up-roas-inconsistent-with-the-bgp-state/.  
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secure application-layer communications. Similarly, parties use the Domain Name 
System Security Extensions (“DNSSEC”) to ensure cryptographic origin validation of 
data when resolving DNS queries. Finally, many network operators currently use 
IRR information to support their route filtering decisions. These services thus provide 
examples that, though imperfectly analogous, are relevant to an RPKI repository 
provider’s risk analysis. 
 We are not aware of a case in U.S. state or federal court involving allegations 
of operational harm based on faulty provision of TLS, Secure Socket Layer (“SSL,” 
TLS’s predecessor), IRR, or DNSSEC information. That does not mean that 
providers of key information within these systems are immune from liability (or 
that they have not settled claims outside of public view), just that no such case has 
yet been litigated. Thus, an inquiry into the bounds of a repository provider’s 
liability should also look to analogies to other forms of trusted information. These 
include maps, financial records and reports, medical information, and the like. Once 
a (necessarily rough) estimate of liability risk is made, it can then inform an 
assessment of different paths of action. As discussed below, the inquiry should look 
at legal techniques to insulate certificate repository providers from liability that do 
not involve indemnification. These include the use of disclaimers of warranties and 
liability, express statements that users are assuming various risks, and disclosures 
that services are being provided on an “as is” basis. The inquiry should also consider 
whether the net value of dropping the RPA exceeds its potential costs in terms of 
liability risk. 
 The unlikelihood of strict products liability. The most serious fear for any 
provider of information is that they might be held liable for harm under a doctrine 
called “strict liability.” Strict liability refers to the imposition of legal responsibility 
for harm, even where the liable party acted with reasonable care in a transaction.  
 This doctrine is unlikely to be applied to providers of RPKI repositories. The 
primary reason for this is that strict liability applies to harms involving products, not 
services. For the most part, information suppliers have been deemed to fall outside 
the sweep of strict products liability because they are providing services.  
 Even in the unlikely event that an RPKI repository were deemed to be a 
product, rather than a service, the application of strict products liability typically 
requires a finding that a given product has been distributed in a defective condition. 
To be deemed defective, a product must fail to meet reasonable consumer 
expectations regarding safety or fail a test pitting the utility of investment in safety 
against the risks of failing to deploy an available safety measure (also known as the 
risk-utility calculus). Assuming an RIR adhered to IETF standards, it would be 
unlikely that a court would find its RPKI materials to be defective under either 
standard.  
 While courts have applied strict products liability to information providers in 
rare cases involving the sellers of defective aeronautical charts, such cases are far 
afield from likely scenarios involving RPKI. In those cases, publishers had made 
precise misrepresentations that were causally linked to deadly plane crashes. The 
reliance of users on the precise details of the maps could not have been more serious 
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or direct. In contrast, occasional problems with specific elements of RPKI information 
are to be expected and are likely to be resolved through various backup mechanisms. 
Harms are likely to be less serious than a plane crash, and there are many best 
practices that network operators should be implementing to prevent bad outcomes in 
the case of RPKI outages or misconfigurations. As a result, the most plausible factual 
scenarios involving RPKI failures are unlikely to tempt courts or juries into applying 
strict products liability to the provision of RPKI repositories. 
 The possibility of negligence liability. While the application of strict 
products liability is quite unlikely, the application of doctrines concerning negligence 
is possible. For instance, the Restatement (Second) of Torts—a respected, though 
nonauthoritative, source on central matters of legal doctrine—identifies 
“[i]nformation [n]egligently [s]upplied for the [g]uidance of [o]thers” as a core kind of 
negligent misrepresentation.25 An allegation of this kind of negligence might, under 
the right circumstances, be asserted against an RPKI repository provider with some 
degree of plausibility. Similar claims might allege other forms of negligence, such as 
negligent hiring and supervision of personnel tasked with operating an RIR’s RPKI 
facilities. To be victorious, a claimant would need to establish that (i) the provider 
had a duty to act with a certain level of care with regard to a given aspect of RPKI 
repository-provision; (ii) the provider breached that duty; (iii) the breach actually and 
proximately caused a resulting injury; and (iv) that injury resulted in cognizable 
harm.  
 The risk of negligence liability is mitigated by a number of factors. First, it is 
highly likely that RIRs will act with the requisite level of care in providing RPKI 
information. They are competent institutions, and if they adhere to the practices and 
procedures developed by the Internet community with regard to RPKI, they will likely 
avoid liability for negligence. Second, the law often prevents parties that acted 
negligently themselves from recovering for negligent misrepresentation. Any party 
utilizing RPKI information—for instance in making route-filtering decisions—would 
themselves be held to a standard of care based on a reasonable network operator’s 
approach to such activities and would have to follow established best practices in 
order to prevail. Third, to the extent claims are brought by parties in privity, courts 
are likely to uphold limitations on consequential damages like the one found in 
ARIN’s RPA. Fourth, to the extent that claims could be brought by downstream 
customers of networks utilizing RPKI information, the liability of an RIR would likely 
be cabined by the doctrine of proximate cause and by doctrines limiting recovery in 
negligence for pure economic loss. 
 Nevertheless, negligence liability is still a reasonable concern. The probability 
and magnitude of such liability is, in the end, uncertain. Despite the fact that network 
operators should be using best practices to ensure that RPKI outages do not cause 
downstream harms, it is of course possible that some operators will not follow best 
practices. In such cases, a harmed party may attempt to sue ARIN alongside their 
                                            
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). 
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network provider. The questions generated by negligence claims are often hard to 
resolve, and this means that the question of legal risk is not cut and dried. Questions 
about particular breaches of duty and the vagaries of causation often generate knotty 
questions of fact, particularly when it comes to highly technical matters. 
Furthermore, even defending against claims that ultimately prove unsuccessful can 
still be costly—especially when questions of fact are involved. Lawyers’ services are 
not free. As a result, our analysis proceeds on the premise that the costs of negligence 
suits—including defense against ultimately unsuccessful claims—are something that 
RIRs should consider. Though our analysis below explores the possibility of 
eliminating the RPA altogether, we believe that the ultimate uncertainty about 
potential negligence claims makes it reasonable for ARIN to retain its RPA as well. 
Further, though we recommend ARIN and its members consider rebalancing the 
current allocation of risk by removing, or at least revising, the RPA’s indemnification 
clause, the ultimate uncertainty about potential negligence claims again suggests 
that reasonable minds can disagree about how far to go in this regard. 
 Dropping the RPA as a strategy to promote RPKI. When distributing an 
RPKI repository, should an RIR require a relying party to enter into an agreement at 
all? This was a central question raised by many interviewees. Interviewees noted that 
three of the five RIRs enable access to their RPKI repositories without placing them 
behind an explicit relying party agreement like ARIN’s RPA.26 Similarly, the Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority (“IANA”) does not require an RPA for its DNS Root 
Zone Trust Anchors27; relying parties are unlikely to be bound by anything like an 
RPA in the TLS context28; and ARIN itself does not require an RPA for parties that 
                                            
26 These RIRs are the African Network Information Centre (“AfriNIC”), the Asia-Pacific Network 
Information Centre (“APNIC”), and LACNIC. See, e.g., RIPE NCC, rpki-validator, supra note 16, at 
lines 140-155. Of these RIRs, APNIC publishes a document that purports to establish a contractual 
relationship between APNIC and the recipients of RPKI certificates, but that document is unclear as 
to its application to relying parties. The ultimate legal status and coverage of that document is beyond 
the scope of this report but has been a topic of community discussion. See Edward Dore, Freethought 
Internet, ARIN RPKI TAL Deployment Issues, NANOG MAILING LIST (Oct. 15, 2018), 
https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2018-October/097543.html. We are counting RIPE NCC’s 
Certification Repository Terms and Conditions as an explicit RPA-style agreement. See RIPE NCC 
Certification Repository Terms and Conditions, RIPE NCC (Sept. 30, 2016), 
https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-asns/resource-management/certification/legal/ripe-ncc-
certification-repository-terms-and-conditions [hereinafter “RIPE NCC Certification Repository Terms 
and Conditions”]. It is beyond the scope of this report whether that agreement would be legally binding 
as to all parties who access the RIPE NCC TAL. 
27 See Trust Anchors and Keys, IANA, available at https://www.iana.org/dnssec/files (last visited Dec. 
27, 2018). 
28 See Steven B. Roosa & Stephen Schultze, The “Certificate Authority” Trust Model for SSL: A 
Defective Foundation for Encrypted Web Traffic and a Legal Quagmire, 22 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L. J. 
3, 6-7 (2010) (discussing documents “purport[ing] to be . . . agreement[s] between the CA and the 
relying party/end user” and stating that “[t]he end user’s assent to these standard documents is 
generally neither obtained nor sought”). 
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utilize its IRR information.29 Interviewees suggested that the value of North 
American ROAs would vastly improve if ARIN opted for a similar agreement-free 
path in the RPKI context. This is because parties worldwide would have an easier, 
less legalistic path to conducting ROV on routes covered by those ROAs. In turn, this 
would increase the value of route-signing in North America. 
 We think the RPA-free path is worth consideration. This is because an 
agreement-free distribution would enable the ARIN Repository to circulate more 
widely than it does at present. To be sure, ARIN would lose legal protection by doing 
so. But if one believes that the likelihood of serious harms from RPKI 
misconfigurations, outages, and accidents is very low, then one should be sanguine 
about losing that protection. The loss of protection would enable wider ROV for North 
American-originated routes, and it would also enable open-source software 
developers to automate the installation of validator software that covered all five 
global regions. Examples of agreement-free distribution in other contexts are 
suggestive, if imperfect, evidence that such a path would be reasonable for ARIN to 
consider.30 
 However, there are risk-reward tradeoffs that are also worth considering. One 
of these tradeoffs has to do with the allocation of liability and responsibility for 
potential problems stemming from repository use. We concluded above that it is 
ultimately uncertain whether RPKI repository providers might face claims of 
negligence that have some plausibility. At the very least, they might have to expend 
resources defending against ultimately unwarranted allegations. Judgments about 
the seriousness of these risks might differ, given the relative novelty of RPKI and the 
range of possible applications of the law. Certainly, we cannot rule out the risk of 
                                            
29 See ARIN’s Internet Routing Registry (IRR), ARIN, https://www.arin.net/resources/routing/ (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2018) [hereinafter “ARIN IRR”]. 
30 Any comparisons of the probabilities and magnitudes of legal risk between RPKI providers, IRR 
providers, the DNS Root Zone Trust Anchor provider, and TLS providers are inevitably fraught with 
difficulty. This is due to the near-complete absence of public legal disputes involving their provision. 
Nevertheless, we may hazard some comparisons. First, IRR is only partially analogous to RPKI. This 
is due to the fact that there are many publishers of IRR information, whereas RIRs serve (by design) 
as exclusive publishers of RPKI information for their regions. As a result, any failure or accident 
involving an RPKI publisher is covered by less redundancy than is present for IRR. In contrast, the 
risks posed by a failure or accident involving IANA’s DNS functions could pose similarly significant 
downstream ramifications as an RPKI failure or accident. As a result, the fact that IANA continues to 
publish its Root Zone Trust Anchors without requiring an RPA is instructive in the RPKI context. 
Finally, the case of TLS certificate authorities (“CAs”) is mixed. Failures or accidents on the part of 
CAs can lead to website unavailability, but such incidents are usually resolved by end users who route 
around the problem. In some cases, legal risk that, in principle, might be shouldered by CAs is passed 
onto browser and operating-system vendors via indemnification clauses, though this is not a universal 
practice. As a result of this diversity, it is difficult to draw direct lessons for RPKI from the TLS context. 
In any event, as noted above, despite periodic problems with TLS (and, prior to TLS, SSL) certificate-
provision, we are not aware of any court cases adjudicating responsibility for end-user harm. 
Stepping back, it is worth noting that all of this discussion happens against the backdrop of widely-
known best practices for mitigating failures and accidents among upstream service-providers. Harms 
are most likely to arise when downstream parties have failed to adopt best practices. 
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legal costs. To mitigate this risk through legal design (in addition to efforts to mitigate 
risk through investment in service-level quality), there are two broad strategies that 
an RIR might pursue. The first of these is the one currently pursued by ARIN: the 
use of an RPA. The second of these is for an RIR to spin off a special-purpose legal 
entity solely for the provision of RPKI information. The latter approach might enable 
an RPA-free distribution even in the face of legal risks. 
 Contract as a strategy for limiting legal risk. The RPA can mitigate much 
of the legal risk posed by RPKI provision. That is because contract clauses that 
explicitly limit liability and establish that the agreeing party assumes various risks 
often suffice to defeat negligence claims (and similar claims of breach of implied 
warranties) asserted by parties to the agreement. For instance, in Virginia, the 
jurisdiction whose law the RPA selects to govern disputes, courts have admitted 
contract clauses as evidence of the express assumption of risk by a party participating 
in a risky activity. Virginia courts also honor clauses limiting liability in some 
circumstances. Finally, Virginia law tends to allow parties to disclaim liability for a 
counterparty’s consequential damages in transactions like the RIR-relying party 
transaction. It is reasonably likely that courts would uphold similar clauses found in 
the RPA. Such clauses—analogous to the “as-is” license language that typically 
accompanies open-source software—enable a service provider to bind direct 
counterparties to a contractual allocation of risks.   
 The value of such terms depends on the seriousness of the risks against which 
they defend compared with the costs they impose on the organizational mission. 
ARIN’s RPA contains terms that seek to limit liability and allocate risks, suggesting 
ARIN favors a cautious approach to liability risk. RIPE NCC follows a similar 
approach. Its Certification Repository Terms and Conditions state that users employ 
the RIPE NCC repository at their “own risk” and that RIPE NCC “is in no way liable 
for direct or indirect damages” stemming from activities involving the repository.31 
As noted above, other RIRs have opted not to require an agreement by relying parties.  
 Ultimately, the decision is a matter of judgment, and both using and foregoing 
an agreement are reasonable choices for an RIR and its community members. While 
ARIN would be on sound footing adopting the approach of the three RIRs that offer 
their TALs without placing it behind an agreement, we view it as reasonable for ARIN 
to maintain their RPA for the purpose of contractually limiting liability and 
establishing that relying parties assume various risks of using the Repository 
information, which is likely to cut off some of ARIN’s legal risk. As noted above, in 
order to make the RPA effective, ARIN would need to continue presenting the 
agreement visually to users of the RPKI repository. This would require software 
developers to build manual RPA-acceptance processes into their validator software 
packages—a deviation from typical methods of automated open-source software 
installation, but not uncommon in software installation more broadly. 
                                            
31 RIPE NCC Certification Repository Terms and Conditions, supra note 26, at art. 4.  
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 Corporate separation as a strategy for limiting legal risk. There are 
clear trade-offs to dropping the RPA, and to revising it. For this reason, it may be 
valuable for the North American Internet community to consider creating a separate 
corporate entity that would be responsible for the operational aspects of RPKI 
repository provision.  
 Why might a new organization be worth considering? At present, the reason 
why ARIN requires its relying parties to sign an RPA is to ensure that legal liability—
even if unlikely—does not threaten the broader mission of the organization. If ARIN 
were to divest itself of the repository-provision side of RPKI and instead contract with 
a separate entity to publish a trustworthy repository, it would no longer bear direct 
legal risk related to outages. The new organization in charge of operating the RPKI 
repository would then be in a position to make its own decisions regarding how much 
legal risk to bear vis-à-vis relying parties. Because it would not have other functions 
that it would have to safeguard, it might see fit to bear more legal risk, such as by 
eliminating the RPA altogether. Assuming ARIN’s transfer of responsibilities did not 
run afoul of legal rules that pass liability through to associated entities, ARIN itself 
would no longer bear legal risk from repository operation. The two organizations 
could coordinate via contract regarding RPKI operations. The corporate structures 
(i.e., boards, procedures) would have to be designed and observed to ensure 
separateness between the two entities.  
 Of course, there are many aspects of corporate separation that are beyond the 
scope of this report, but which would affect the viability of the proposal. At this stage, 
we recommend that corporate separation be considered alongside other methods of 
reducing legal barriers to RPKI adoption. It should be discussed by ARIN and the 
Internet community in the coming months, as dialogue on RPKI progresses. 
 The benefits and costs of forgoing indemnification. Let us now set aside 
the idea of corporate separation and turn back to the RPA. If ARIN determines that 
it is appropriate to maintain the RPA, it may still be valuable to remove (or, in the 
alternative, revise) the RPA’s indemnification clause in favor of an “as is” disclaimer 
of warranties.  
 What does the indemnification clause do? At its root, indemnification requires 
the relying party to bear the burden of various costs associated with a covered set of 
legal risks. In case of the RPA, the covered set of legal risks is expansive. The RPA’s 
indemnification clause covers “any and all claims” that are “asserted by a third party 
in connection with” two types of events—(i) the use of RPKI information and services 
or (ii) the breach of the RPA’s terms.32 The clause covers situations where the use or 
breach was by the relying party or by any “[a]ssociated [p]ersons,” such as customers 
or clients.33 
                                            
32 Specifically, “any and all claims, demands, disputes, actions, suits, proceedings, judgments, 
damages, injuries, losses, expenses, costs and fees (including reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses), 
interest, fines and penalties of whatever nature.” ARIN RPA, supra note 14, at § 7. 
33 Id. 
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 In such a situation, what would the relying party owe to ARIN? The key terms 
of ARIN’s indemnification agreement—“indemnify, defend, and hold harmless”—
impose distinct responsibilities.34 First, the duty to “indemnify” would require the 
relying party to pay for a covered set of losses suffered by ARIN after they were 
established through a legal process. Separately, the “duty to defend” would require 
the relying party to cover the ARIN’s “expense of defending suits” alleging harm from 
covered activities.35 Finally, some courts would treat the obligation to “hold harmless” 
as a right of ARIN to be released from suit brought by the relying party.  
 This clause provides benefits to ARIN in terms of reducing legal risk. 
Indemnity insulates ARIN from the monetary costs of adverse legal outcomes. And 
even before such an outcome might come to fruition, the “duty to defend” would 
require a relying party to cover the costs of legal defense of all claims falling within 
its scope. This right to defense would be available to ARIN early in litigation—before 
a court reached the merits of an underlying suit. As a result, it would allow ARIN to 
avoid litigation costs associated with even meritless claims brought against it. 
 At the same time, some interviewees regarded the RPA’s indemnification 
clause as a barrier to RPKI adoption. This is due in part to its mere existence and 
due in part to its particular terms. Recall that many organizations require formalized 
review of any agreement containing an indemnification clause. This costs time and 
deters network engineers from proposing RPKI within their organizations. The 
clause’s terms are also more stringent than some organizations would likely accept 
for the purpose of participating in RPKI as early adopters. In particular, the clause 
as currently drafted is quite broad: it requires relying parties to indemnify ARIN even 
for its own negligence. Interviewees noted that they were wary of binding their 
organizations to defend and indemnify ARIN for such a broad swath of activity. 
Further, they stated they were wary of indemnifying ARIN when the value of RPKI 
is unclear and when they were unsure of ARIN’s investments to ensure that RPKI 
functions reliably on a day-to-day basis. These factors have deterred a number of 
potential adoptees from advancing RPKI within their organizations.  
 Some interviewees suggested that the publication of more materials like 
ARIN’s Certificate Practices Statement and further outreach to members might allay 
their concerns about indemnification. Others suggested that the clause be revised or 
deleted from the RPA. 
 How should ARIN and its members evaluate the indemnification clause issue? 
It poses a tradeoff between the legal risk-reduction benefits of the clause and the drag 
it creates on RPKI adoption. The risk-reduction function of the indemnification clause 
is only relevant to the extent ARIN is likely to face legal risk for incidents involving 
RPKI. Though this risk is difficult to estimate, two factors suggest it is not grave. 
First, as discussed above, the RPA’s disclaimer of warranties and liability would 
provide substantial (though certainly not total) protection against liability. Second, 
                                            
34 Id. 
35 Capital Envt’l Servs., Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 536 F. Supp. 2d 633, 640 (E.D. Va. 2008) (applying 
Virginia law) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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research has not revealed negligence suits involving comparable security 
information, such as TLS (and its predecessor SSL), IRR, or DNSSEC.  This absence 
is suggestive, but it is not dispositive. If a widespread RPKI outage were to harm 
many customers of ARIN’s relying parties, then the indemnification clause would 
indeed protect it from serious legal risk. On the other side of the scale, the community 
must weigh exactly how serious a block the indemnification clause is to their 
organizations’ willingness to agree to the RPA. Our interviews suggest that it is 
significant. Engineers seeking to adopt RPKI usually are doing so out of a sense that 
the framework will benefit the entire community, including their organizations. But 
the gains are not generally perceived to be so significant that they would justify 
indemnifying ARIN for its own negligence.  
 Given these equities, the ARIN membership might consider asking ARIN to 
drop the indemnification clause while maintaining clear disclaimers of warranties 
and limitations of liability within the RPA. Doing so would eliminate the moral 
hazard problem associated with having relying parties indemnify ARIN for its own 
negligence. ARIN is the best-positioned party to reduce its own risk of acting 
negligently and thus should certainly bear that burden. Further, ARIN is well-
positioned to reduce the ultimate risk of harm through investments in the quality of 
its provision and through clear disclaimers applicable to relying parties. Though the 
elimination of the indemnification clause would shift some legal costs from relying 
parties to ARIN at the margin and may drive up ARIN’s insurance costs, the shift 
would simultaneously remove a clear barrier to RPKI adoption. Notably, ARIN 
already makes this tradeoff in some cases: it willingly drops the indemnification 
clause for certain governmental counterparties (discussed in Section 3.4 below). This 
suggests that the clause may not be strictly necessary.   
 Dropping the indemnification clause (while retaining disclaimers and 
limitations on liability) would also bring ARIN closer to comparable RIRs on this 
issue. ARIN is the only RIR that clearly imposes an indemnification clause as such 
on repository access and is the only RIR to impose independent obligations to defend 
or hold harmless. While RIPE NCC does disclaim liability,36 this falls short of 
requiring that relying parties provide an affirmative promise to indemnify, defend, 
and hold RIPE NCC harmless. AfriNIC and LACNIC, for their parts, appear not to 
have comparable disclaimers of liability at all, let alone indemnification agreements. 
All in all, ARIN places more burdens on its relying parties than do the other RIRs. 
 ARIN’s choice to impose an indemnification clause is also more burdensome 
than approaches taken by IANA with regard to its DNS Root Trust Anchors,37 the 
providers of the OpenSSL Toolkit,38 or ARIN’s approach to its Internet Routing 
                                            
36 See RIPE NCC Certification Repository Terms and Conditions, supra note 26, at art. 4. 
37 See Trust Anchors and Keys, IANA, available at https://www.iana.org/dnssec/files (last visited Dec. 
27, 2018).  
38 See License, OPENSSL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND SSL/TLS TOOLKIT, available at 
https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2018).  
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Registry.39 To be sure, other security resources are provided against the backdrop of 
indemnification clauses, as are many Internet services—including residential “last 
mile” service.40 The Terms of Use for ARIN’s Whois Terms of Use, which network 
operators likely encounter through their typical operations, also contain an 
indemnification clause to which (at least to our knowledge) network operators have 
not objected.41 Similarly, providers of DNS services require their users to indemnify 
them.42 But all this is merely suggestive. The real question is one of ARIN’s own 
optimization. Given the costs of the indemnification clause on ROV adoption and 
ARIN’s ability to insulate itself from a significant bulk of liability risk through the 
use of disclaimers and explicit statements of risks, dropping the clause in favor of an 
“as is” disclaimer of warranties may be the best path, perhaps in conjunction with an 
increase in insurance coverage to address residual risk of litigation costs.  
 In the alternative, ARIN should at least consider narrowing the clause 
significantly, to remove the moral hazard problem arising from indemnification 
applicable to its own negligence. Specifically, it could limit indemnification to 
situations where a relying party or downstream customer of a relying party failed to 
live up to a set of common best practices in relation to RPKI’s role in real-time routing 
practices.  
 Such practices, of course, are essential to Internet security in a world of 
widespread RPKI deployment, no matter the legal consequences.43 Collaborative 
efforts that publicize best practices, such as the Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing 
Security (“MANRS”),44 therefore serve a dual purpose of promoting RPKI adoption 
directly and reducing the chances of RPKI-related incidents turning into legal issues. 
These chances are likely low already, but the more investment that network 
operators put into best practices, the lower they become. 
                                            
39 See ARIN IRR, supra note 29.  
40 See, e.g., digicert, Certificate Services Agreement §§ 6.3-6.4 (Apr. 12, 2017), available at 
https://www.digicert.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Certificate-Services-Agreement.pdf 
(indemnification limited to claims arising out of the actions of the customer or customer’s agent); 
Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, Comcast Agreement for Residential Services, XFINITY, 
https://www.xfinity.com/Corporate/Customers/Policies/SubscriberAgreement (last visited Dec. 27, 
2018); Charter Commc’ns, Inc., Charter Residential Internet Service Agreement, SPECTRUM, 
https://www.spectrum.com/policies/residential-internet-tc.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2018). 
41 See, e.g., Whois Terms of Use, ARIN, at § B.5 (Apr. 9, 2014), https://www.arin.net/whois_tou.html. 
42 See, e.g., Oracle Services Agreement, ORACLE DYN at § 14 (Apr. 6, 2017), https://dyn.com/legal/dyn-
services-agreement/. 
43 See, e.g., Randy Bush, RFC 7115, supra note 1. 
44 See Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security, MANRS, https://www.manrs.org (last visited Dec. 
27, 2018). 
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3.4 Direct Access by Governmental Entities 
 
 In addition to the general issues surrounding direct access to the ARIN RPKI 
repository, interviewees also raised issues specifically applicable to government 
entities. These have to do with terms in the RPA that government agencies regard as 
problematic. First, federal procurement law prohibits federal actors from 
authoritatively agreeing to the RPA’s indemnification clause.45 Second, under some 
circumstances, federal agencies are discouraged from agreeing to alternative dispute 
resolution procedures like arbitration.46 Third, similar prohibitions operate at the 
state and local level and also sometimes forbid accepting agreements that specify the 
choice of law outside the state in which the governmental entity sits.47 A number of 
interviewees stated that the presence of indemnification and choice-of-law clauses in 
the RPA were gating issues that prevented them from considering ROV. 
 This set of barriers is easily resolved. ARIN already has adopted a policy of 
modifying both clauses for governmental entities to the extent necessary to comply 
with applicable law or regulations.48 This policy eliminates the concerns raised by 
interviewees about governmental entity access, although it would be valuable for 
ARIN and its members to publicize this policy more broadly and to inform the 
community of which government agencies that have previously received waivers or 
modifications of the problematic clauses. 
                                            
45 The Anti-Deficiency Act prohibits government employees from authoritatively agreeing on behalf of 
the government to “unrestricted, open-ended indemnification agreement[s]” like the one in ARIN’s 
RPA. See The Anti-Deficiency Act Implications of Consent by Government Employees to Online Terms 
of Service Agreements Containing Open-Ended Indemnification Clauses, 36 Op. O.L.C. at 1, 2012 WL 
5885535 (Mar. 27, 2012), available at https://www.justice.gov/file/20596/download (“A government 
employee with actual authority to contract on behalf of the United States violates the Anti-Deficiency 
Act by entering into an unrestricted, open-ended indemnification agreement on behalf of the 
government. A government employee who lacks authority to contract on behalf of the United States 
does not violate the Anti-Deficiency Act by consenting to an agreement, including an agreement 
containing an unrestricted, open-ended indemnification clause, because no binding obligation on the 
government was incurred.”). 
46 See 5 U.S.C. § 572(b). 
47 See, e.g., 1 CAL. STATE CONTRACTING MANUAL § 7.86 (2017), available at 
http://www.dgs.ca.gov/Portals/32/Users/141/25/3725/8%20Pages%20from%20SCM%20June%202017-
3.pdf (prohibiting agreement to indemnification clauses); Katherine A. Adams, Contract Law for State 
Purchasing Officers § III.G (Sept. 23, 2013), available at 
https://www.naepnet.org/resource/collection/A9EC9928-E0AA-4604-85AE-
28941F4BE73C/Contracting_101_Handbook.docx (discussing rules governing choice of law clauses for 
Kentucky government entities). 
48 See Registration Services Agreement (RSA) FAQ, ARIN, 
https://www.arin.net/resources/agreements/rsa_faq.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2018) [hereinafter 
“ARIN RSA FAQ”].  
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3.5 Legal Barriers to Indirect Use  
 
 Beyond directly downloading an RPKI repository from an RIR or via a third-
party software tool to conduct their own ROV, network operators may also benefit 
from using RPKI repository materials as inputs to support more complete services. 
For instance, services are emerging that use RPKI information to clean up IRRs. 
Others combine RPKI information, IRR information, and other inputs to create 
dynamic route-filtering advice for end users. Many of these services are being offered 
by third-party providers. End users employing these emerging services do not 
necessarily need to access the RIR RPKI repositories directly to benefit from RPKI. 
The same is true with services that translate RPKI ROAs into IRR objects and with 
public monitoring projects, such as Certificate Transparency reporting. This Section 
discusses legal barriers to the development of software and services that enable the 
indirect use of RPKI information. 
 The prohibited conduct clause. The major barrier to the development of 
indirect RPKI uses is the “prohibited conduct” clause in ARIN’s RPA. This clause 
states that information derived from the ARIN Repository may be made available to 
third parties only “so long as such use and disclosure is solely for informational 
purposes, namely reporting, educational, summary or statistical purposes, and such 
use and disclosure of the information is not in a readily machine-readable format.”49 
This imposes limit on parties’ authority to redistribute the repository or to circulate 
information that uses the information contained in the repository as an input.  
 The benefits of the prohibited conduct clause. The prohibited conduct 
clause is intended to protect ARIN against liability for accidents involving certain 
uses of its repository information. Consider the following hypothetical situation. 
Imagine that a party relying directly on information obtained from ARIN’s RPKI 
repository simply redistributed that information free of any agreement to anyone who 
asked for it. This could potentially open up ARIN to exactly the kinds of tort claims 
(discussed in Section 3.3 above) against which the RPA is designed to protect. The 
prohibited conduct clause defends against this hypothetical by placing the onus on 
relying parties to ensure that all users using information that they download from 
the ARIN RPKI repository are bound by the RPA. Unfortunately, it also impedes 
third-party RPKI offerings.  
 The costs of the prohibited conduct clause. Multiple interviewees stated 
that the prohibited conduct clause is an impediment to important software- and 
service-development efforts for RPKI. Recall that RPKI deployment presents a 
chicken-and-egg problem, where the value of issuing ROAs depends on the extent to 
which networks filter based on invalid and unsigned routes. Given that reality, the 
development of “turnkey” validation support services will remove important barriers 
to the deployment of ROV filtering. As noted above, ARIN took an important step in 
                                            
49 ARIN RPA § 5, supra note 14 (emphasis added). 
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reducing the legal barriers to such development when it announced that third-party 
software developers could incorporate acceptance of the RPA into their software 
packages. This means that open-source validation packages like RIPE NCC’s can now 
build the process of downloading ARIN’s TAL directly into their workflow if they so 
choose. However, the prohibited conduct clause still prohibits would-be providers 
from selling or giving away services that include information derived from the ARIN 
Repository presented in common formats like JavaScript Object Notation (“JSON”) 
or Comma-Separated Values (“CSV”) or domain-specific protocols like RPKI-Router. 
(For instance, a router vendor might operate a ROA cache and enable a turnkey ROV 
configuration option within its routers.) These prohibitions make it harder than 
necessary to design useful RPKI-based services. They also block the emergence of 
service providers that would be most likely to promote best practices for RPKI usage. 
 Enabling indirect use. Given those costs, ARIN should consider altering the 
prohibited conduct clause to facilitate third-party RPKI system development. In 
addition to the beneficial step already taken by ARIN to support third-party 
validation software, we suggest two further strategies for reform. First, ARIN might 
consider allowing distribution of services making use of RPKI information as an input 
on the condition that they require users to accept the RPA or an appropriate variant 
of it for the use case involved. This would be quite similar to the allowance ARIN has 
made for designers of validation software, but it would extend to more robust service 
providers. Alternatively, ARIN could require these robust service providers to protect 
ARIN via an intended third-party beneficiary clause.50 This is a common 
arrangement used in many analogous settings, including free and open-source 
software,51 and if drafted well, can be reliably expected to be upheld in court.52 ARIN 
should evaluate such approaches and consider whether to enable them on a 
permissionless or permissioned basis. 
 Second, ARIN should also consider revising its prohibition on distributing 
information in “machine-readable format.” Even if ARIN does not wish to enable 
wholesale redistribution of its actual RPKI repository, it should still support broader 
distribution of information created with RPKI as an input for research and analysis 
purposes. Crucially, such information is far more valuable when in machine-readable 
format, because it enables sophisticated analysis and trendspotting. To strike a better 
balance, ARIN may wish to rephrase the clause to prohibit using repository data for 
purposes other than supporting operational RPKI ROV functionality. RIPE NCC, for 
instance, forbids using its Repository data for “identification purposes, advertising, 
direct marketing, marketing research or similar purposes.”53 A tailored prohibition 
along those lines would enable active community members to share their RPKI 
                                            
50 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 302 (1981). 
51 See, e.g., NASA Open Source Agreement v1.3 (NASA-1.3), OPEN SOURCE INITIATIVE, 
https://opensource.org/licenses/NASA-1.3 (last visited Dec. 27, 2018). 
52 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 302 (1981) (citing cases). 
53 RIPE NCC Certification Repository Terms and Conditions, supra note 26, art. 3. 
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analyses in computable formats without fearing retribution. Alternatively, ARIN 
could explicitly allow machine-readable distribution for specific research and analysis 
purposes. 
4. ROUTE ORIGIN AUTHORIZATION 
 
 This Section turns from ROV-based filtering to Resource Certification access 
and ROA-signing. Without active signing of ROAs, there would not be any useful 
information to support ROV. As a result, it is necessary for RIRs to encourage IP 
address space holders to obtain the cryptographic keys that enable them to sign ROAs 
and then use those keys to begin doing precisely that. This Section discusses the legal 
issues that interviewees flagged as potential hindrances to access to, and active use 
of, RPKI keys. It is motivated by the objective of ensuring broad access to RPKI keys, 
consistent with reasonable allocation of risks and duties among stakeholders.  
4.1 Background 
 
 At present, the entire RPKI system is anchored in trusted allocations of RPKI 
private keys to parties that are authorized to originate routing announcements for 
particular IP address spaces. The responsibility for authorization is held by each RIR.  
 Holders of IP space administered by ARIN must sign two agreements to receive 
access to the private keys that enable the issuance of ROAs. First, entities that wish 
to sign ROAs must sign either an RSA if they received their IP addresses after ARIN 
was created or a Legacy Registration Services Agreement (“LRSA”) if they obtained 
their IP addresses before ARIN came into existence. The RSA and LRSA (which now 
contain identical terms) cover the entire scope of a relationship between ARIN and a 
member, including RPKI. Second, IP address holders that wish to sign ROAs must 
sign an RPKI Terms of Service Agreement. This agreement covers specific aspects of 
the ARIN-member relationship involving RPKI. Unlike the RPA, none of these 
agreements is browsewrap. Instead, they are explicitly signed by parties that wish to 
receive their RPKI keys.  
 Concerns raised by interviewees over these agreements are described and 
evaluated in the Sections that follow. In Section 4.2, we address legal impediments 
created by the LRSA. In Section 4.3, we address issues concerning governmental 
access to Resource Certification. 
4.2 Legacy Access 
 
 To receive the private keys that enable the issuance of ROAs for legacy address 
space, entities must consent to ARIN’s LRSA.54 Many interviewees stated that this 
requirement poses a barrier to RPKI adoption for legacy IP address holders. While 
                                            
54 This includes entities that have already signed RSAs for non-legacy address space. 
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some legacy address holders have overcome the barrier and chosen to sign ARIN’s 
LRSA, others view it as prohibitive. 
 Perceived problems with the LRSA. Interviewees reported that the LRSA 
might act as an impediment because of its terms—specifically, the requirement that 
signatories to “acknowledge[] and agree[] that” they lack property rights in their IP 
number resources.55 Some legacy resource holders view this as an unreasonable 
concession due to their view that they hold rights that would be given away via such 
an acknowledgment. They view themselves as the owners or legitimate controllers of 
their legacy IP resources and do not want to run the risk of turning over any iota of 
their present control to ARIN. 
 Assessing the cost of LRSA barrier. The perceived hindrance posed by the 
LRSA’s clause regarding property rights is real, but it is difficult to measure its 
impact. At present, the broader issue of legacy resource treatment is negatively 
impacting the comparatively narrow and logically distinct issue of RPKI adoption. 
Legacy resource holders that are interested in participating in RPKI but are 
apprehensive about signing ARIN’s LRSA must decide which position they value 
more. Anecdotal evidence indicates that multiple parties faced with that tradeoff 
have opted to avoid RPKI. That is, the current linkage between the LRSA and RPKI 
access likely is not driving legacy holders to sign the LRSA. Rather, it is turning them 
away from RPKI. 
 It is worth exploring whether decoupling the issues could enable ARIN to 
better serve its goal of driving RPKI participation while respecting the rights of its 
full members and without reopening the contentious “property rights” issue. This 
would be especially valuable in North America, where there is a higher concentration 
of legacy IP holdings than in other regions. As a result, ARIN’s decision to tie the 
RPKI to the LRSA poses a higher cost on RPKI adoption in North America than it 
would in other regions. 
 We do not mean to overstate the importance of the LRSA. It is not clear 
whether the LRSA is a “but-for” cause of non-adoption. At present, most network 
operators that have signed LRSAs still have not deployed RPKI. The same is true for 
the IPv6 address spaces held by IPv4 legacy resource holders that signed RSAs in 
order to obtain their IPv6 address blocks. Lessening the perceived burden of the 
LRSA would hardly be a silver bullet. In addition, transfers of legacy IP space 
continue to reduce the set of legacy holders for whom the LRSA might be barrier. 
Nevertheless, it would be valuable to remove the LRSA as a roadblock on the path to 
widespread issuance of ROAs. 
 A potential path forward. To achieve more widespread ROA-issuance, ARIN 
may wish to consider altering its approach to the “no property rights” clause. The key 
role played by the “no property rights” clause in the LRSA is to create a structure 
                                            
55 ARIN, Registration Services Agreement (LRSA: Version 4.0) § 7 (Aug. 16, 2016), available at 
https://www.arin.net/resources/agreements/rsa.pdf. 
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that enables ARIN to provide registration services to LRSA signatories under 
conditions it sees as appropriate for operating its authoritative registry. The LRSA 
gives a party “[t]he exclusive right to be the registrant” of a given address block, and 
the “right to transfer the registration” within the ARIN registry under the terms of 
ARIN’s governance.56 This set of rights is paired with the “no property rights” clause 
concept to clearly establish ARIN’s control over how transfers and registrations take 
place within its registry. One can think of the “no property rights” clause as one side 
of a deal and the rights of registration and transfer as the other side. 
 ARIN and its members should consider whether to decouple that entire deal 
from the RPKI Resource Certification process. That is, they should consider offering 
a transactional pathway to obtaining RPKI private keys that neither requires a “no 
property rights” admission, nor delivers any rights regarding registration or transfer 
of IP space. By separating RPKI from the property rights controversy, ARIN would 
open the RPKI door to LRSA holdouts. ARIN could adopt an at-will, fee-for-service 
model for this pathway, in which ARIN protects all its other rights as put forth in the 
normal LRSA. Further, this clause could contain a provision allowing termination 
with explicit reversion to the status quo ante. 
 This would place ARIN closer to RIPE NCC and the Asia-Pacific Network 
Information Centre (“APNIC”). Both have constructed multiple pathways to receive 
RPKI services that do not require the signing of a full member services agreement.57 
For RIPE NCC, these include the options of (i) signing a “non-member service 
contract,” (ii) contracting with a sponsoring Local Internet Registry, and (iii) seeking 
an accommodation for special circumstances.58 Each of these pathways separates the 
question of access to RPKI keys from the broader question of a legacy resource 
holder’s relationship with the RIR and requires those benefiting from RPKI services 
to compensate the RIR for the costs of making them possible. Thus, entities wishing 
to avoid an affirmative consent to the idea that they hold no property rights in 
registered IP resources (something also contained in RIPE NCC’s Standard Services 
Agreement)59 can opt for one of the alternate pathways. 
 Under a non-member service contract, legacy resource-holders could be 
ushered into the RPKI fold without having to overcome their deep-seated opposition 
to agreeing to the LRSA. In such a contract, ARIN could retain broad rights to deliver 
or terminate RPKI services and support to parties unwilling to sign the LRSA. In 
                                            
56 Id. § 2(b). 
57 See APNIC Non-Member Resource Services Agreement, APNIC (July 1, 2002), 
https://www.apnic.net/about-apnic/corporate-documents/documents/membership/non-member-
agreement/; RIPE NCC Services to Legacy Internet Resource Holders, RIPE NCC (Mar. 16, 2015), 
https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-639; Policy for Resource Certification for Non-RIPE NCC 
Members, RIPE NCC (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-596. 
58 See RIPE NCC Services to Legacy Internet Resource Holders, RIPE NCC, at § 2 (Mar. 16, 2015), 
https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-639. 
59 See RIPE NCC Standard Services Agreement, RIPE NCC, at § 10.2 (Dec. 27, 2016), 
https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-673. 
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essence, such a structure would give ARIN an ongoing option to deliver RPKI services 
to non-signatories of the LRSA. This could help bring more participants into the ROA 
process. The attractiveness of this approach would depend on the interest and 
willingness of paid-in ARIN members to facilitate greater service-provision to those 
not yet signed up.  
4.3 Governmental Access to Resource Certification 
 
 As with access to the ARIN RPKI repository discussed in Section 3.4 above, 
governmental entities have special concerns when it comes to accessing Resource 
Certification. Both the RPKI Terms of Service and the RSA or LRSA contain 
indemnification, arbitration, and choice of law clauses that may be outside the bounds 
of an agency’s ability to contract. The solution here is identical to what was proposed 
above: ARIN and the NANOG community should publicize ARIN’s policy of dropping 
both clauses for governmental entities that are barred by law or regulation from 
agreeing to them.60 ARIN should also present the RPKI Terms of Service to new 
LRSA (and RSA) signatories during the member onboarding process. This would save 
repeat visits between lawyers. 
 Our interviews indicate that governmental agencies also might view 
themselves as prohibited by internal policy from disavowing property rights in their 
legacy IP address allocations. The “non-member services” pathway to accessing RPKI 
keys discussed in Section 4.2 above would help address this concern. 
5. USING PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS TO PROMOTE ADOPTION 
 
 Beyond remedying explicit barriers to adoption, it is also possible to use other 
legal mechanisms to affirmatively promote adoption. This Section discusses one such 
mechanism: procurement requirements.  
 Procurement requirements are demands that large organizations place on 
their suppliers. When a major corporation requires its outside law firms to have 
certain forms of insurance or to engage in certain sustainability practices with their 
office real estate, it acts as a significant force in the marketplace. The desire to tap 
into these opportunities encourages more expansive use of insurance and 
environmentally friendly building design and management.  
 Procurement requirements could also be a lever to promote RPKI. If a large 
organization required its network providers (whether last-mile ISPs, backbone 
providers, or otherwise) and outsourced information technology providers (including 
providers of email, file-storage, DNS, cloud and similar services) to adopt RPKI 
signing and filtering as a condition of doing business with it, then those providers 
would likely adopt the practice. Once they adopted the practice at the behest of one 
client, they could offer RPKI services to other clients, as well. This positive feedback 
can help drive RPKI adoption. Recall that RPKI adoption becomes increasingly 
                                            
60 See ARIN RSA FAQ, supra note 48.  
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valuable to every potential participant as more participants come online. This means 
that if a major participant joins the fray, it adds to the incentives for others to 
participate. This effect is even more powerful when a major actor uses leverage to 
convince others to participate. Procurement contract requirements function as just 
that kind of lever.  
 Who might serve the role of catalyst? One obvious candidate—and a significant 
potential actor—is the U.S. federal government. There is ample precedent for the 
federal government promoting new technology through procurement policy. For 
instance, in 2005, the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) sought to promote 
adoption of IPv6 by requiring agencies to achieve certain transition benchmarks over 
a series of years. As the network security community makes progress towards RPKI 
adoption, it should consider whether to encourage OMB to take similar steps with 
RPKI.  
6. ENSURING OPERATIONAL READINESS 
 
 The goal of widespread RPKI adoption is at the heart of this report. But 
adoption is only beneficial to the extent it is implemented properly. Indeed, many 
interviewees emphasized that widespread RPKI adoption must to be accompanied by 
high levels of operational competence to ensure that RPKI is a source of security, and 
not a source of newly-introduced problems.  
 Interviewees who raised this theme tended to coalesce around three main 
points. First, network operators that begin making routing decisions based on RPKI 
information must adopt best practices when they do so. They must prepare to handle 
outages on the part of the RIRs, and they must be ready to failover gracefully. In 
short, no informational service is reliable and available 100% of the time, and RPKI 
is no exception. As a result, all network operators must ensure that their networks 
are resilient in the face of unavailable RPKI publication points and other problems 
that may arise despite every participant’s best efforts. Second, interviewees stated 
that network operators would benefit from greater clarity regarding how the five 
RIRs intend to deliver their RPKI services. Interviewees reported that standardized 
and expanded disclosures of service-level intentions among the RIRs would enable 
network operators to better prepare themselves for foreseeable contingencies when 
relying on RPKI. Third, RIRs must prepare to provide real-time support for RPKI 
services. 
 Although evaluation of particular best practices and service-level intentions 
among operators and RIRs is beyond the scope of this report, the general lesson is 
essential: it is far more valuable to reduce risks than to allocate them via well-crafted 
legal arrangements. At its best, good legal design can incentivize risk reduction, but 
the lion’s share of risk reduction will depend on the initiative and ingenuity of 
engineers and technical staff at network operators and at the RIRs. 
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7. CONCLUSION 
 
 This report has evaluated barriers to adoption of RPKI driven by issues of law 
in North America, and it has proposed ways to overcome them. These include 
alterations to ARIN’s agreements applicable on both the filtering and signing sides 
of the RPKI equation. They also include a proposal for using procurement 
requirements as a catalyst to adoption. The report is not meant, however, to be a 
definitive statement of best practices for the North American network security 
community. Rather, it is meant to open dialogue on salient issues facing the 
community. Each recommendation would benefit from public discussion and analysis 
to surface hidden tradeoffs and to take stock of the Internet community’s priorities. 
If the report contributes to more clarity and candor regarding how best to evaluate 
the inherent tradeoffs in coordinating a cryptographic security framework in the 
decentralized environment of the Internet, then it will have served its purpose. 
